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UX in AI: Trust in Algorithm-based Investment Decisions
Leon Szeli
University of Cambridge and Technical University Munich
Abstract
This Thesis looks at investors’ loss tolerance with portfolios managed by a human advisor compared to an algorithm with
different degrees of humanization. The main goal is to explore differences between these groups (Humanized Algorithm,
Dehumanized Algorithm, Humanized Human and Dehumanized Humans) and a potential diverging effect of humanizing. The
Thesis is based on prior research (Hodge et al., 2018) but incorporates new aspects such as additional variables (demographics,
prior experiences) and a comparison between users and non-users of automated-investment products. The core of this research
is an experiment simulating an investment portfolio over time with four different portfolio managers. Subjects were asked to
decide if they want to hold or sell a declining portfolio at five points in time to measure their loss tolerance. A cox regression
model shows that portfolios managed by the Humanized Human had the highest loss tolerance. Humanizing leads to higher
loss tolerance for the human advisor but to lower loss tolerance for algorithmic advisors within the non-user group.
Keywords: Künstliche Intelligenz; Artificial Intelligence; Behavioral Finance; Behavioral Economics;
Human-Computer-Interaction; User Experience; Investmententscheidungen; Nutzervertrauen.
1. Introduction
This world is endowed with a limited number of AI (Arti-
ficial Intelligence) experts. The average citizen has a cartoon-
ish understanding of AI based on overindulgent media head-
lines, which in itself is a by-product of a rapidly developing
area. These headlines can have positive or negative connota-
tions. Headlines such as the following are abundant in some
of the most prestigious newspapers: “News broadcast trig-
gers Amazon Alexa devices to purchase $170 doll houses”,
“Robot passport checker rejects Asian applications because
eyes are closed”, “Robots judge a beauty contest and don’t
select women with dark skin”, or “Microsoft’s Twitter chatbot
turns anti-feminist and pro-Hitler” (Leaden, 2017). Not all of
these examples are caused by AI or algorithmic flaws, but in
the general perception that does not matter. These headlines
fuel mistrust and are not easily remedied by positive reports.
Nonetheless, trust in AI will be the driving factor for adop-
tion in many industries. A good example to illustrate this
is the financial sector. While AI already enjoys a high level
of trust in some areas (entertainment, navigation), only half
of people trust algorithmic investment advice (Shandwick,
2016). If the trust level does not change, Roboadvisors will
never be able to reach mass market. This fact in itself makes
for a compelling research project. Whereas, for the past ten
years, most researchers have agreed that humans trust hu-
mans more than AI. A recent range of experiments has con-
tradicted that common understanding (Hodge et al., 2018).
Previously, you received advice from a human being, but
now, due to rapid technological progress, you can also at-
tain advice from AI systems like Roboadvisors. Roboadvisors
are automated, algorithmic investment products. In 2017,
Roboadvisors already had $9.1 billion under management
globally (Eule, 2017). Experts predict $2.2 trillion under
Roboadvisor management by 2020 (Epperson et al., 2015).
Whether or not these predictions become true depends on
whether users adopt the new technology. Whether they take
the financial advice of a human being over an algorithm crit-
ically depends on trust (Hodge et al., 2018).
Yet, while the Roboadvisor industry is growing, there is
little research examining how and when consumers trust the
financial advice of algorithms. Which factors, from a psycho-
logical point of view, influence whether consumers trust AI?
Despite the vast number of factors influencing trust and the
variety of AI use cases, this paper focuses only on a selection
of them. One factor that could drive trust in these products
is the humanization of the algorithm. Does it help to make
the algorithm more human and social, e.g. by naming it?
AI-based assistants such as Amazon’s Alexa, Microsoft’s Cor-
tana and Apple’s Siri have a humanized interface, although
DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.5282/jums/v5i1pp1-18
L. Szeli / Junior Management Science 5(1) (2020) 1-182
contemporary research voices doubt the positive influence on
trust (Hodge et al., 2018). From this paradox, the research
question of this thesis is derived: Does trust (measured as
loss tolerance) in the financial advice of an algorithm (versus
a human) depend on the degree to which the algorithm is hu-
manized (giving the algorithm a human name)? To answer
the research question, we conducted an online survey includ-
ing experiments with users of the Roboadvisor Ginmon and
non-users. Moreover, we looked at additional factors such as
demographics and prior investment experiences.
2. State of Research
This chapter sheds light on the current state of research
regarding trust. First, we look at the trust in humans – its
original sense. Subsequently, trust in technology is exam-
ined.
2.1. Defining Trust
Trust as a basis for decision-making in diverse contexts
has been studied in various fields. Cho et al. (2015) provide
a clear overview of the multidisciplinary meanings of trust
(Cho et al., 2011; Gambetta, 2000; James, 2002; Kydd, 2005;
Lagerspetz, 1998; Lee and See, 2004; Mayer et al., 1995;
Rotter, 1980):
Based on the multitude of meanings of trust, Cho et al.
(2015) summarize the concept of trust as follows:
“Trust is the willingness of the trustor (evalua-
tor) to take risk based on a subjective belief that
a trustee (evaluatee) will exhibit reliable behav-
ior to maximize the trustor’s interest under un-
certainty (e.g., ambiguity due to conflicting evi-
dence and/or ignorance caused by complete lack
of evidence) of a given situation based on the
cognitive assessment of past experience with the
trustee.” (p. 28:5)
When individuals decide if they trust an entity, we call this
process trust assessment. Cho et al. (2015) summarize this
process as “Trustor i assesses Trustee j’s trust if j can perform
Task A” (p. 28:5). According to game theoretic approaches,
trustor i is defined as someone who maximizes their inter-
est (or utility) from the relationship with the trustee (Chin,
2009). Trustee j is someone who can cause impact on a
trustor’s utility with his/her behavior (Castelfranchi and Fal-
cone, 2010).
Task A is a crucial factor in the decision if i trusts j as the
importance of the tasks influences the risk assessment and
potential outcomes. Afterwards, i adjusts trust according to
whether the decision was right or wrong (Cho et al., 2015).
2.2. Trust in Information Technology
This chapter explains trust between humans and infor-
mation technology. The concept of trust is not only appli-
cable to human-to-human relationships but also to human-
to-technology relationships (Coeckelbergh, 2012). Never-
theless, there are differences between the two relationships
(Mcknight et al., 2011). Firstly, regardless whether it is about
trust in people or trust in technology, it involves risk and
uncertainty. In the case of humans, you lack total control.
You depend on the trustee to fulfill expected responsibili-
ties which s/he might not fulfil – (un)intentionally. In the
case of machines, you also do not have the control as a user
since the technology might not demonstrate the expected ca-
pability (i.e., without intention). For example, when you
trust Dropbox to save your data, you are exposed to the
risk of data transmission over the internet and storing con-
fidential data on a third-party server. Secondly, people have
moral agency and volition whereas technology is amoral and
non-volitional. For example, when you use a word process-
ing program like Grammarly it will correct misspelled words
and grammatical errors. But a benevolent human copyedi-
tor might alter your text (reflecting his/her willingness and
therefore volition) in order to help you improve even though
it is not part of his/her job. A technology will only follow
instructions programmed. Thirdly, the trustor’s expectations
regarding the object of dependence might be different when
comparing humans to machines. When trusting people, you
expect them to fulfil a task for you in a competent way. When
trusting a technology, you want it to demonstrate possession
of functionality. A human helps you if s/he cares for you
and is benevolent towards you. A machine’s helpfulness is
not rooted in moral agency, but you still expect effective help
(e.g. a help menu). When trusting humans, we hope for
integrity, reliability and consistence in their actions. Due to
humans’ free will, this is a risk. In a machine, we are looking
for reliability. It should operate consistently without failing.
Potential failures are caused by a bug and not by deliberate
actions (Mcknight et al., 2011).
As described in chapter 2.2.3, trust in technology can be
influenced by many factors. Siau and Wang (2018) struc-
tures these in multiple dimensions: Human characteristics
(Personality, Ability), Environment Characteristics (Culture,
Task, Institutional Factors) and Technology Characteristics
(Performance, Process, Purpose) (Siau and Wang, 2018). For
example, someone with a rather trusting personality (Human
Characteristic) is likely to trust the technology in the task of
filesharing (Environment Characteristic) no matter whether
Google Drive or Dropbox is used (Technology Characteristic).
2.3. Trust in Automated and Digital Domains (e-Trust)
So far, we have been describing trust as a general concept
and in the context of Information Technology. This chapter
focuses on trust in more digital and automated domains.
2.3.1. Defining Trust in AI, HCI and Automation
Cho et al. (2015) defined key trust components for the
three domains AI (Artificial Intelligence), HCI (Human-
Computer Interaction) and Automation. All of the three
applications fall in the category of “e-trust” which is trust
occurring in digital contexts (Taddeo, 2010). They are struc-
tured based on four kinds of trust. First, Communication
Trust which can be measured objectively (i.e. network con-
nectivity). Second, Information Trust which includes quality
L. Szeli / Junior Management Science 5(1) (2020) 1-18 3
Table 1: Multidisciplinary Definitions of Trust according to Cho et al. (2015)
Discipline Meaning of Trust Source
Sociology Subjective probability that another party will perform an action
that will not hurt my interest under uncertainty and ignorance
Gambetta (2000)
Philosophy Risky action deriving from personal, moral relationship be-
tween two entities
Lagerspetz (1998)
Economics Expectation upon a risky action under uncertainty and igno-
rance based on the calculated incentives for the action
James (2002)
Psychology Cognitive learning process obtained from social experiences
based on the consequences of trusting behaviors
Rotter (1980)
Organizational Management Willingness to take risk and being vulnerable to the relationship
based on ability, integrity, and benevolence
Mayer et al. (1995)
International Relations Belief that the other party is trustworthy with the willingness
to reciprocate cooperation
Kydd (2005)
Automation Attitude that one agent will achieve another agent’s goal in a
situation where imperfect knowledge is given with uncertainty
and vulnerability
Lee and See (2004)
Computing &
Networking
Estimated subjective probability that an entity exhibits reliable
behavior for particular operation(s) under a situation with po-
tential risks
Cho et al. (2011)
of information and credibility. Third, Social Trust which
describes trust between humans in a social network. And
fourth, Cognitive Trust which refers to accumulated knowl-
edge regarding reliability and competence of the trusted
party.
As you can see from Table 2, there are many overlaps
in the different areas of trust and applications (availability
in Communication Trust, belief in Information Trust, im-
portance in Social Trust, expectation in Cognitive Trust).
Nonetheless, there are differences and you have to be sure if
you are talking about just one of the domains, an overlap of
two or a mixture of multiple (Cho et al., 2015).
2.3.2. Human vs. Machine: Algorithm Aversion vs. Algo-
rithm Appreciation
As initially stated, algorithms perform better than hu-
mans in many cases. Nonetheless, many humans rather trust
a human prediction than an algorithmic prediction (Diab
et al., 2011; Eastwood et al., 2012). In literature, this phe-
nomenon is called algorithm aversion. Experiments support
that – even if the algorithm outperforms the human (Di-
etvorst et al., 2015). Humans are more tolerant if a human
is mistaken than if it is an algorithm (Dietvorst et al., 2018).
Additionally, humans put more weight on human statements
(Önkal et al., 2009; Promberger and Baron, 2006).
Multiple scholars investigated potential reasons for algo-
rithm aversion: The human desire for perfection (Dawes,
1979; Einhorn and Hogarth, 1988; Highhouse, 2008), the
assumption that the human learns based on past experience
(Highhouse, 2008), the missing humaneness (Dawes, 1979;
Grove and Meehl, 1996) and ethical concerns (Dawes, 1979).
Algorithm aversion has been the status quo, but a re-
cent set of experiments conducted by researchers from Har-
vard Business School contradicts these findings (Logg et al.,
2019). They found empirical evidence for Algorithm Appre-
ciation which means that the humans relied more on algorith-
mic advice than on human advice. They ran six experiments
with the following findings: a) people relied on algorithmic
advice rather than on humans when estimating a person’s
body weight based on a picture (Experiment 1A), forecasting
the popularity of songs (chart ranking) and romantic matches
(attractiveness of the opposite gender) (Experiments 1B and
1C), b) algorithm appreciation persisted no matter if the ad-
vice appeared jointly or separately (Experiment 2) and c) Al-
gorithm appreciation was reduced when people could choose
between an algorithm’s estimate and their own (versus an
external advisor’s; Experiment 3) and when they had experi-
ence in forecasting (Experiment 4).
As a conclusion, we can say that there is no clear answer
to the questions whether humans prefer to trust humans or
algorithms. There is additional research required in all kinds
of domains.
2.3.3. Relevant Trust Factors in AI-based Products
Various factors influencing trust have been identified in
past research. The last decades were mainly focused on trust
in automation and robotics. In the past years, also studies
about trust in digital products and, more specifically, AI have
been published. To get an overview, the identified factors are
summarized in this chapter. Tables with all factors can be
found in the appendix (Table 13, 14 and 15). The sources
are mainly meta analyses which represent multiple other pa-
pers (Adams et al., 2003; Cho et al., 2015; Hancock et al.,
2011; Siau and Wang, 2018). Factors which are not appli-
cable for Roboadvisors were neglected. Highly overlapping
factors and factors which are only differing due to denota-
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Table 2: Key trust components in different domains according to Cho et al. (2015)
Communication
Trust
Information Trust Social Trust Cognitive Trust
Artificial Intelligence Cooperation,
availability
Belief, experience,
uncertainty
Importance, honesty Expectation, confidence,
hope, fear, frustration,
disappointment, relief,
regret
Human-Computer
Interaction
Reliability,
availability
Belief, experience,
uncertainty
Importance, integrity Expectation, frustration,
regret, experience, hope,
fear
Automation Reliability,
availability
Belief, experience Integrity, importance Expectation, confidence
tion of the authors were summarized as one. The factors
can be separated into three categories: Factors regarding the
Trustee (the institution/technology (provider) – in our case
Ginmon/Ginmon’s algorithm), Trustor (the human user) and
Environment (contextual, situational) (Adams et al., 2003).
To summarize, we can say that the Trustor is looking for a re-
liable and adaptable product that is transparent in its actions.
The Trustee’s trust in AI depends on his/her demographics,
personality and prior touchpoints with the topic. The envi-
ronmental factors concern the task, legal aspects, risk as well
as influence from other people or the current state of mind.
Due to the multitude of trust factors, we decided to focus
on one which seems particularly interesting: humanization.
This decision, as well as the factor itself, will be elaborated
further in chapter 2.4.4 and 2.4.5.
Researchers came up with a wide range of different theo-
retical models regarding trust in technology and/or automa-
tion incorporating some of the mentioned factors. The main
frameworks which were developed between 1989 and today
are summarized in a Table 12 in the appendix.
We can observe the following patterns among trust mod-
els: a) most focus on automation and include an opera-
tor that receives recommendations but still has the decision
power, b) numerous factors are involved due to the complex-
ity of trust as a concept and c) most models are generic and
not tailored towards a specific technology (e.g. algorithmic
investment decisions).
There is no model (yet) whose application would help us
answer our research question on AI-based investment prod-
ucts. Therefore, we follow a rather exploratory approach
which is not based on a theoretical model but nonetheless
incorporates empirical findings from the past.
2.4. Trust in Automated Investment Decisions
Trust plays an important role in finance, no matter if it is
on the global, institutional level or on the people-to-people
level (Bottazzi et al., 2016). Giving another entity money
involves risk and vulnerability. For digital finance products,
trust is even more crucial since there is less human face-to-
face interaction (Greiner and Wang, 2010). Especially, new
and innovative products (fintechs) are key as there is less
experience value (Van Thiel and Van Raaij, 2017).
2.4.1. Trust in Roboadvisors
This research is focusing on so-called Roboadvisors which
came up after the financial crisis in 2008. “Robo-Advisors
provide investing advice, wealth management services,
sometimes in addition to data aggregation. These Fintech
companies provide investment advice and trading services
that are automated using algorithms and artificial intelli-
gence" (Gold and Kursh, 2017, p.140). In 2017, Roboadvi-
sors managed $200 billion in assets (Eule, 2017). Roboadvi-
sors have two main benefits: cost saving due to automation
and transparency due to the user interface (Salo, 2017).
Therefore, also people who did not have the financial re-
sources to pay a human financial advisor to manage their
money have the chance to invest in a comparable manner.
There is no human intervention other than the user deciding
to liquidate the portfolio managed by the algorithm. How
can trust be built if there is no human involved? A similar
case is e-banking where ease of use, usefulness, perceived
privacy and perceived security are considered trust builders
(Yousafzai et al., 2003). In the case of Roboadvisors, price
and trustworthiness (initial and ongoing trust) additionally
come into play when it comes to building trust (Lee et al.,
2018).
Roboavisors have different customer segments with dif-
ferent expectations. Salo (2017) identified four groups of
Roboadvisor users based on their technoliteracy and financial
literacy. The “delegators” want to outsource their investing
to someone. Therefore, they are looking for an easy, avail-
able, neutral solution with low costs. The “optimizers” look
for the most efficient (easier/cheaper) solution. They usu-
ally have a little more knowledge and net worth than the
delegators and would like to be involved in the investment
process, if it could increase returns. The third group is called
“Do-It-Yourself”. These users want to make investment deci-
sions themselves and are only seeking for advice to consider.
The advisor plays a smaller role than in the other two groups
(Carré et al., 2016; Salo, 2017). When we talk about build-
ing users trust, we have to be clear if we are talking about
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all potential users, current users or a specific user group.
Since there is only very little research on users of Roboad-
visors present, this work is looking at all potential users as
well as current users. Looking at a specific user group might
be a good idea in a second step.
2.4.2. Trust as a Reaction to Financial Losses
As described in earlier chapters, trust is closely related
to risk: “Trust is the willingness of the trustor (evaluator) to
take risk [. . . ].” (Cho et al., 2015, p 28:5). Nonetheless, it is
not the same (Houser et al., 2010). Traditional finance the-
ory and psychological literature have different understand-
ings of risk. In traditional finance theory, risk is defined as the
variance of the expected distribution of returns (Bernstein,
1996; Haugen, 1995). For psychologists, risk is synonymous
to loss. The higher your trust in the decision-maker, the big-
ger your loss tolerance (Payne, 1975; Shapira, 1995; Slovic
and Lichtenstein, 1968; Teigen, 1996). Also, you are more
likely to forgive a mistake (which is a bad trade in the case
of Roboadvisors) (Dietvorst et al., 2018). In this thesis, we
take the psychological perspective.
In addition to risk, vulnerability was mentioned multiple
times in the different definitions of trust. Trust is only re-
quired, if you have “something to lose”. Furthermore, trust
is an important factor in investment decisions, such as buying
and selling stocks (Guiso et al., 2008). Therefore, we decided
to simulate an investment portfolio in our experiment, which
will be described later. To find out how the respondents react
to losses, we decided to have a constantly declining portfolio.
We should keep in mind that we are not measuring trust di-
rectly but loss tolerance (Will they liquidate the portfolio?)1.
Behavioral Economics literature suggests that two bi-
ases might occur in this experiment: loss aversion and sunk
costs. According to prospect theory (Kahneman and Tver-
sky’, 1979), individuals prefer avoiding losses to making
equal gains. In the context of stock markets, this can lead to
holding stocks which are losing in value for too long instead
of selling them despite loss (Odean, 1998). Another effect
that leads to following through with your portfolio, even if
it is declining, is called sunk costs. Sunk costs are costs that
have already been incurred and cannot be reversed. In our
case it means that investors already have spent time (e.g.
keeping track of portfolio’s value). Additionally, costs that
will irrevocably incur in the future are included (Arkes and
Blumer, 1985). Since the portfolio of our participants in our
experiment is declining and involves sunk costs, we have to
keep the two biases in mind.
2.4.3. The Case of Ginmon
This work looks at one Roboadvisor – Ginmon – in spe-
cific. The Frankfurt-based startup was founded in 2014 and
is among the leading Roboadvisors in Germany. They offer
1Limitations caused by the dependent variable are addressed in Chapter
5. Interpretation, Limitations and Future Research
an automated investment portfolio that is managed by an al-
gorithm called Apeiron. Ginmon charges you 0,39% of your
invested amount and 10% of your gains.
Your portfolio is allocated based on your risk class (from
1 to 10). To determine your risk class, you have to answer
9 questions – just like with a human advisor. The questions
can be found in the attachment. After being assigned to a
risk class there is no other human intervention needed. The
only intervention possible is liquidating the portfolio. The
algorithm takes care of everything else (buying and selling,
rebalancing). The customer can check the current value of
the portfolio at any time.
The minimum investment amount is 1000€ , which is
much less than traditional advisors require. Nonetheless,
wealthy individuals are more attractive customers as they in-
vest more money and therefore the share Ginmon receives is
bigger. Generally speaking, people with high net worth are
older (Krause and Schäfer, 2005). Also, these people have
more reservations towards digital products (Millward, 2003).
This paradox explains the company’s interest in the question
how to build trust in their product.
2.4.4. Anthropomorphism
As mentioned earlier, humanization of algorithms or de-
picting them as social can influence users’ trust. The techni-
cal term for that phenomenon is called Anthropomorphism.
According to Guthrie (1993) Anthropomorphism describes
perceiving humanlike characteristics such as physical appear-
ance, emotional or mental states and motivation in nonhu-
man agents (Guthrie, 1993). Humanizing nonhuman agents
in order to increase user acceptance has been investigated in
the past (André et al., 2018; Epley et al., 2008). Examples in-
clude making a chatbot more social by imitating human-like
behavior, giving it a face/avatar or a name.
2.4.5. Research Question & Hypotheses
Humanizing technology demonstrated benefits in some
domains (e.g. IBM’s “Watson” or Amazon’s “Alexa”) but the
effects are not clear in financial advising (Hodge et al., 2018).
Human-Computer-Interaction research in the past suggests
that humanization of technology leads to positive feelings to-
wards the technology and increases the likelihood to use the
technology (Burgoon et al., 2000; Chaminade et al., 2007;
Eyssel et al.; Gong, 2008; Venkatesh, 2000). However, that
does not necessarily mean that the technology is perceived
more trustworthy or persuasive (Nan et al., 2006; Riegels-
berger et al., 2005). It has been shown that naming a tech-
nology can decrease its credibility, which also decreases trust.
A technology can be perceived simple and unable to complete
complex tasks if it is named (Hafer et al., 1996; Riegelsberger
et al., 2005). Naming a human on the other hand, is bene-
ficial. Sharing personal information increases the trust level
because the advisor is willing to risk his reputation (Garner,
2005; O’Keefe, 1990; Pornpitakpan, 2004).
Hodge et al. (2018) have shown that humanizing a
Roboadvisor decreases the likelihood of subjects to follow
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investment recommendations. For human advisors the op-
posite is the case. The Humanized Human was the advisor
whose recommendations were followed the most (73,6%).
Second was the Dehumanized Roboadvisor (69,7%), third
the Humanized Roboadvisor (59,2%) and fourth the Dehu-
manized Human (54,7%) (Hodge et al., 2018).
We are interested in the threshold where people lose trust
(which means sell) in their portfolio – their loss tolerance. Is
there a difference in users’ trust depending on the type of
advisor (human/algorithm) and the level of humanization
(humanized/dehumanized)?
There are many definitions of losing trust but in our case,
we understand it as a point in time where the trustee (user)
loses hope in the ability of the trustor (Roboadvisor) to reach
the desired outcome (increase in portfolio value)2. We as-
sume that each individual has a certain “pain threshold” of
loss and as soon that is exceeded, they lose trust and sell
(liquidate the portfolio). Based on the mentioned findings,
we formulate our hypotheses:
H1: Respondents’ loss tolerance is the highest for portfolios
managed by Humanized Humans (“Anlageberater Charles”).
H2: Respondents’ loss tolerance is the second highest for
portfolios managed by Dehumanized Algorithms (“Algorith-
mus”).
H3: Respondents’ loss tolerance is the third highest for port-
folios managed by Humanized Algorithms (“Algorithmus
Charles”).
H4: Respondents’ loss tolerance is the lowest for portfolios
managed by Dehumanized Humans (“Anlageberater”).
H5: Respondents’ loss tolerance is higher for portfolios man-
aged by Humanized Human than for a Dehumanized Human.
H6: Respondents’ loss tolerance is higher for portfolios man-
aged by Dehumanized Algorithm than for a Humanized Al-
gorithm.
While our own hypotheses are mainly based on Hodge’s
findings, there are some distinct differentiations to his work.
Firstly, Hodge focuses on investors’ recommendations and
whether people follow advice. For Roboadvisors, you usually
just invest money and the Roboadvisor has full control after-
wards. This means that the user is not involved in decision-
making anymore due to automation and therefore does not
receive advice. As a result, we decided to focus on the ques-
tion if and how long people trust the algorithm with their
money instead of “following recommendations”. Secondly,
Hodge’s sample consists of 108 MBA students which means
they have a) a lot of background knowledge in finance and
b) are rather young. Reaching older users with less knowl-
edge about digital products and finance is crucial for mass
adoption of Roboadvisors. Therefore, we were aiming for a
more diverse sample. Thirdly, Hodge gave participants exten-
sive background information about the potential investment
decisions. AI-based products and Roboadvisors specifically
cannot provide this in real life and, therefore, “blind” trust is
required from users. As a consequence, we decided to give
2Limitations caused by the dependent variable are addressed in Chapter
5. Interpretation, Limitations and Future Research
subjects less background information. Fourth, Hodge is look-
ing at one-time investment decisions while we are looking
at a portfolio over time. Fifth, Hodge et al. (2018) analyse
their data with t-tests and ANOVAs while we took a differ-
ent approach for the data analysis (cox regression). Sixth,
Hodge et al. (2018) did not look at demographic factors or
prior investment experiences which we do by controlling for
them and comparing users of automated investment prod-
ucts to non-users. We try to thereby contribute to validating
the findings while also expanding them.
3. Method
This chapter provides additional information on the sam-
ple and survey participants, data collection procedure, and
the instruments.
3.1. Sample and Participants
The survey, conducted in December 2019, was sent to
German Ginmon customers as well as non-customers. The
goal was to gain insights on users and non-users of AI-based
products. A total of 258 people took part in the survey with
an almost equal split between users and non-users. 82% are
male, 18% female. The average age was 36,6, the youngest
participant was 18, the oldest 80. When interpreting results,
we have to keep in mind that this sample does not represent
the German population3.
3.2. Data Collection Procedure
The survey contained 13 closed questions – and took
about five minutes to complete. Ginmon users were con-
tacted using Ginmon’s newsletters. The non-users were
mainly recruited using the authors’ social media profiles.
These efforts lead to 258 started surveys out of which 223
were completed.
3.3. Instruments
The first question was an experiment where respondents
were randomly assigned to one of four groups. The par-
ticipants then observed a portfolio which was either man-
aged by a) the human advisor named Charles (“Anlageberater
Charles”), b) the unnamed human advisor (“Anlageberater”),
c) the algorithm named Charles (“Algorithmus Charles”) or
d) the unnamed algorithm (“Algorithmus”).
The information about the portfolio manager was fol-
lowed by a graphic representation of the portfolio over time.
The portfolio was initially worth 10.000€ . The participants
were asked at 5 points in time (February until July) whether
they wanted to either hold or sell. If they always chose to
hold, it looked as follows:
The goal of this question was to find out when partic-
ipants lose trust in their respective portfolio manager and
3Limitations caused by the sample will be elaborated in the Chapter 5.
Interpretation, Limitations and Future Research
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Figure 1: Simulated portfolio in the survey
sell. We wanted to conduct an experiment which is realistic.
Therefore, it was also possible to never sell the portfolio. This
means a cox regression was the way to analyze the data as it
is censored (the event of selling does not occur for every par-
ticipant). When designing the experiment, past research with
similar settings was taken into account (Glaser and Walther,
2013). We are convinced that this approach is a good choice
since scholars in the past showed that asking for trust directly
in self-report measures does not have strong validity and re-
liability (Cho et al., 2015; Dzindolet et al., 2003; Mcknight
et al., 2011).
In the second question, participants had to distribute
10.000€ between an algorithm as an investor and a human
advisor. This joint evaluation is a complement to the separate
evaluation in question one. Attributes are easier to evaluate
when advisors are presented jointly due to increased infor-
mation (Hodge et al., 2018). The third section was about
demographics (age, gender) and if they ever invested money.
If they replied no, the survey was over. If they replied yes,
they were asked about their investment experience thus far.
How much experience did they have? Did they have ex-
perience with automated investments? Did they ever use
Ginmon? How happy were they with their returns?
4. Results
The survey had 258 respondents (82% male4, MAge =
36,6, SDAge = 15,7) out of which 233 finished the survey.
The sample size for the following analyses varies due to 35
dropouts. Our sample consists of 110 people (70% male,
MAge = 27,2, SDAge = 13,5) who have never used the Roboad-
visor Ginmon and 113 people (93% male, MAge = 45,6, SDAge
= 18,2) who use Ginmon. The sample is not representative
for the average German5. Due to our sampling method, that
was not expected in the first place.
4.1. Experiment I: Simulating a Portfolio with Four Different
Portfolio Managers
First, we will look at the results of Experiment I which
helps us compare the four different types of portfolio man-
agers.
4.1.1. Behavior of Overall Sample
To get a first overview of the data collected throughout
the experiment, the following flow chart shows when and
4The impact of the gender distribution on representativeness will be dis-
cussed in Chapter 5. Interpretation, Limitations and Future Research.
5The limitations for generalization associated with this sampling will be
discussed in Chapter 5. Interpretation, Limitations and Future Research.
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Figure 2: Flow chart depicting sales over time (n = 258)
if participants liquidated their portfolio. It contains the total
sample, including all four conditions (Humanized Algorithm,
Dehumanized Algorithm, Dehumanized Human and Human-
ized Human).
As seen in Figure 2, out of 258, 161 (62,4%) never sold
their portfolio. 97 respondents (37,6%) sold it. The decline
in the portfolio increases over time, nonetheless most people
(37) sell in the third month – not in the fifth (9 sales). In
general, the respondents held their portfolio for too long. A
potential explanation for this phenomenon could be the ear-
lier mentioned loss aversion and sunk costs fallacy. These
biases explain why people hold their declining investment
portfolios for longer than a rational person should. The re-
spondents are averse to losses which means they tend to not
realize their losses by liquidating and “wait it out” instead.
In addition, they invested time and energy by tracking the
portfolio changes over time. They cannot get the lost time
back, so they think it is wasted if they do not manage to sell
the portfolio without loss. As a result, they hold the portfo-
lio. Rational behavior would be to only let future costs affect
their decisions.
4.1.2. Comparing the Four Portfolio Managers
To analyze the data, we used a cox regression, also called
survival analysis. First, we performed a cox regression which
compares the experimental groups to the group Humanized
Human. We chose the reference group based on Hodge et al.
(2018) – we assume this group is the one with the highest
loss tolerance and therefore the least sales. Additionally, it
makes sense to benchmark the other groups against the Hu-
manized Human since this is still the standard case. When
you interact with your bank, you usually talk to a human.
Control variables will be added to the model in a later step.
As you can see from Table 3, participants were 2.93
more likely to sell their portfolio when it was managed by a
Humanized Algorithm (vs. a Humanized Human) (95% CI,
1.518 - 5.655; P<0.01). When the portfolio was managed by
a Dehumanized Algorithm (vs. a Humanized Human), how-
ever, participants were (only) around two times (2.093) more
likely to sell their portfolio (95% CI, 1.118-3.914; P<0.05).
Finally, when the portfolio was managed by a Dehuman-
ized Human (vs. Humanized Human), participants are still
around 1.3 times more likely to sell (95% CI, 0.701-2.481;
P>0.056).
If we create a ranking of the four groups for “loss toler-
ance” from highest (least sales) to lowest (most sales) and
compare them to findings of Hodge et al. (2018)7, it looks as
follows:
In Table 5, we summarized the results of our Hypotheses
1 to 4: First, in line with H1, we find that participants toler-
ate losses in their portfolio the most when their portfolio is
managed by a Humanized Human. The other three groups
have a higher likelihood to sell than the reference group (Hu-
manized Human). Second, our results do not support H2.
We assumed respondents’ loss tolerance is the second high-
est for portfolios managed by Dehumanized Algorithms (“Al-
gorithmus”) but it ranked third. Third, our results do not
support H3. We expected the third highest loss tolerance for
the group Humanized Algorithm, but the loss tolerance was
the lowest. Fourth, H3 is also not supported by our results.
We expected the lowest loss tolerance for the group Dehu-
manized Human, but loss tolerance was the second highest.
4.1.3. Interaction Effect of Humanizing
H5 and H6 are stating that humanizing has a positive ef-
fect (in terms of loss tolerance) for human advisors but a neg-
ative effect for algorithmic advisors. Our ranking above sup-
6The significance level is discussed in Chapter 4.1.5 Exploratory Analysis.
7The differences between both studies regarding the Dependent Variable
will be discussed in Chapter 5. Interpretation, Limitations and Future Re-
search.
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Table 3: Cox regression (n=258)
Group B HR 95% CI P Values
Humanized Human
Dehumanized Human .277 1.319 0.701 2.481 .390
Dehumanized Algorithm .738 2.093 1.118 3.914 .021
Humanized Algorithm 1.075 2.930 1.518 5.655 .001
Table 4: Comparison of group ranks in two studies
Group
Ranked by loss tolerance
(Szeli 2019)
Ranked by likelihood to
follow recommendation
(Hodge et al., 2018)
Humanized Human 1 1
Dehumanized Human 2 4
Dehumanized Algorithm 3 2
Humanized Algorithm 4 3
Table 5: Results of Hypotheses 1 to 4
Hypotheses Result
H1: Respondents’ loss tolerance is the highest for portfolios managed
by Humanized Humans (“Anlageberater Charles”).
True
H2: Respondents’ loss tolerance is the second highest for portfolios
managed by Dehumanized Algorithms (“Algorithmus”).
Not true
H3: Respondents’ loss tolerance is the third highest for portfolios
managed by Humanized Algorithms (“Algorithmus Charles”).
Not true
H4: Respondents’ loss tolerance is the lowest for portfolios managed
by Dehumanized Humans (“Anlageberater”).
Not true
ports this reasoning; the Humanized Human (Rank 1) out-
performs the Dehumanized Human (Rank 2), but the Hu-
manized Algorithm (Rank 4) underperforms the Dehuman-
ized Algorithm (Rank 3). To test these predictions quantita-
tively, we computed a 2 (advisor: human vs. algorithm) x
2 (humanization: humanized vs. dehumanized) cox regres-
sion model (Table 6).
The main effect of the type of advisor is marginally sig-
nificant (p=.064). Given the b-value of -.461 and the coding
of our variables, we can say that portfolios managed by Hu-
man Advisor were sold less than portfolios managed by an
Algorithmic Advisor. The interaction effect between the fac-
tors humanization (named vs. unnamed) and advisor (hu-
man vs. algorithm) was not significant (p=.133). That is,
the effect of humanization on selling is not statistically dif-
ferent for a human (vs. algorithm). According to the rank-
ing reported in Table 4 as well as our Hypotheses 5 and 6,
we assumed a different finding. We expected a significant in-
teraction effect since the Humanized Human had the highest
loss tolerance while the Humanized Algorithm had the low-
est loss tolerance (Table 4). Thus, we will take a closer look
at the changes in significance in later chapters, if we split the
data set (4.1.5 Comparing users and non-users) or increase
sample size (4.1.6 Exploratory analysis).
4.1.4. Prior Investment Experiences and Demographics
In this chapter, we analyze variables related to prior in-
vestment experiences and demographics. 31 respondents
(14%) have never invested money. The remaining 190 (86)
consider their experience with investing money and auto-
mated investments as follows:
Most subjects consider themselves “advanced” investors,
only a few edge cases are “newbies” or “experts”.
In automated investing, more subjects are newbies and
beginners:
The majority (Figure 5) had at least neutral experiences
with the returns on their investment in the past. Only a few
are very unhappy. One possible explanation for that can be
that many respondents are in their twenties which means
they have been investing in a bull market (since 2009) all
their adult life.
Earlier studies have shown that demographic factors and
past investment experiences play an important role in peo-
ple’s future investment behavior (Grinblatt and Keloharju,
2000; Schnell, 2011; Statman, 1999). Therefore, we decided
to calculate an extension of the initial cox regression model
(Table 3) by controlling for the following factors: Age, Gen-
der, Satisfaction with past returns, Experience with investing
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Table 6: Main effects and interaction effects (Cox Regression; n=256)
Effect df B SE HR P Values
Humanization (named/unnamed) 1 .277 .322 1.319 .390
Advisor (Algorithm/Human) 1 -.461 .249 .630 .064
Humanization x Advisor 1 -.614 .414 .541 .138
Figure 3: Experience with investing money (n=190)
Figure 4: Experience with automated investments (n=190)
Figure 5: Satisfaction with past returns
and Experience with automated investing (see Table 7).
Table 7 shows that all of the added factors are not sig-
nificant. Moreover, we find that the coefficient of the four
different portfolio managers do not change substantially, if
we include this set of control variables. Thus, these findings
suggest that the results reported in 4.1.2 hold true controlling
for demographical variables (e.g. gender, age) and for previ-
ous financial experiences (e.g. experiences with automated
investing).
4.1.5. Comparing Users and Non-users
In this chapter, we compare Ginmon users (N= 110, 93%
male, MAge =45,6, SDAge = 18,2) versus Ginmon non-users
(who have never used any other Roboadviser) (N= 113, 70%
male, MAge =27,2, SDAge = 13,5)8.
First, we ran the cox regression (Table 3) again – but this
time with a split dataset. Table 8 reports differences between
users and non-users.
As one can see, results across Ginmon users versus non-
users (Table 8) are very similar to the results without splitting
the data (Table 3), since the ranking of the groups relative to
the reference group Humanized Human is the same.
If we compare users to non-users, particularly striking is
that the p-values for all groups are lower for non-users than
for users while all the b-values are higher. That is, users are
8The differences between in age and gender will be discussed in Chapter
5. Interpretation, Limitations and Future Research.
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Table 7: Extended Cox regression (n=258)
Group B HR 95% CI P Values
Humanized Human
Dehumanized Human .098 1.104 0.535 2.276 .790
Dehumanized Algorithm .651 1.918 0.943 3.899 .072
Humanized Algorithm 1.020 2.773 1.304 5.897 .008
Age -.004 .996 .982 1.010 .575
Gender -.440 .644 .341 1.217 .175
Satisfaction with past returns -.191 .826 .621 1.101 .192
Experience with investing .176 1.192 .867 1.639 .280
Experience with automated
investing
.029 1.030 .763 1.389 .849
Table 8: Cox regression for users (n=113) and non-users (n=110)
Cox regression for users (n=113)
Group B HR 95% CI P Values
Humanized Human
Dehumanized Human .384 .681 .242 1.914 .466
Dehumanized Algorithm .826 .439 .160 1.203 .110
Humanized Algorithm .916 .400 .143 1.122 .082
Cox regression for non-users (n=110)
Humanized Human
Dehumanized Human .475 .622 .313 1.237 .176
Dehumanized Algorithm .823 .439 .216 .892 .023
Humanized Algorithm 1.531 .216 .098 .477 .000
less likely to sell their portfolio across all four conditions.
Compared to the original sample (n=256), for non-users we
found lower p-values despite reduced sample size (n=110)9.
Second, we ran the cox regression with a 2x2 design test-
ing for main and interaction effects (like in Table 6). But this
time, the analysis was split by users and non-users (Table 9).
For non-users, the interaction effect (p=.015) is signifi-
cant. Thus, for nonusers, humanizing has a different effect
on the time of selling the portfolio depending on whether the
advisor is a human or an algorithm. Humanizing the human
leads to less sales while humanizing the algorithm leads to
more sales (compared to the non-humanized counterpart).
For users, however, we cannot make the same statement since
the effect of humanizing was not significant (p=.454). Given
Table 9 and the results of our ranking, we can say that the
following hypotheses hold true for nonusers:
H5: Respondents’ loss tolerance is higher for portfolios man-
aged by Humanized Human (“Anlageberater Charles”) than
for a Dehumanized Human.
H6: Respondents’ loss tolerance is higher for portfolios man-
aged by Dehumanized Algorithm (“Algorithmus”) than for a
Humanized Algorithm (“Algorithmus Charles”).
9Possible explanations for the differences between users and non-users
and ideas for future research are reported in Chapter 5. Interpretation, Lim-
itations and Future Research.
4.1.6. Exploratory Analysis
The interaction effect in the overall sample (Table 6) as
well as in the non-user group (Table 9) was not significant.
To explore whether and how this would change with in-
creased sample size, we (artificially) duplicated our dataset
(Table 10).
Given the larger sample size, the interaction effect
(p=.036) and the main effect of the advisor type (p=.009)
are significant. Based on the b-value (-.461) and our cod-
ing, we can say that there is a main effect which means that
portfolios managed by a human were less likely to be sold
than portfolios managed by the algorithm. Based on these
findings, one could speculate that rerunning the experiment
— with an increased sample size — could yield a significant
interaction effects of the factor Advisor and Humanization x
Advisor (and therefore H5 and H6 would hold true)10. There
needs to be additional empirical validation in the future. We
suggest a bigger sample size or a research design which al-
lows to test with an ANOVA, so significant effects can be
found more easily due to uncensored data.
Since none of the control variables were significant, we
also decided to rerun a cox regression including factors which
10More details on potential future research can be found in Chapter 5.
Interpretation, Limitations and Future Research.
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Table 9: Main effects and interaction effects for users (Cox Regression; n=113) and non-users (n=110)
Main effects and interaction effects for users (Cox Regression; n=113)
Effect df B SE HR P Values
Humanization (named/unnamed) 1 .385 .528 1.469 .466
Advisor (Algorithm/Human) 1 -.370 .370 .645 .235
Humanization x Advisor 1 -.477 .636 .621 .454
Main effects and interaction effects for non-users (Cox Regression; n=110)
Humanization (named/unnamed) 1 .475 .351 1.608 .176
Advisor (Algorithm/Human) 1 -.348 .288 .706 .226
Humanization x Advisor 1 -1.183 .488 .306 .015
Table 10: Main effects and interaction effects with doubled sample size (Cox Regression; n=512)
Effect df B SE Exp(B) P Values
Humanization (named/unnamed) 1 .277 .322 1.319 .224
Advisor (Algorithm/Human) 1 -.461 .249 .630 .009
Humanization x Advisor 1 -.614 .414 .541 .036
were closest to marginal significance level. Again, we dou-
bled the sample size (Table 11) to explore, if our sample size
is the reason the control variables are not significant.
Interestingly, gender is now significant (p=.04). Also,
prior investment experience (p=.108) and satisfaction with
returns (p=.078) have p-values close to the marginal signif-
icance level. Given the negative b-values of Gender (B = -
.445; Coding: 1= female, 2=male) and Satisfaction with re-
turns (B= -.180; Coding: 1= very unhappy, 5= very happy),
we can conclude that females and respondents who were un-
happy with the past performance of their portfolio were more
likely to sell than their counterparts. The positive b-value of
investment experience (B = .163; Coding: 1 = Newbie, 5
= Expert), means that more experienced people were more
likely to sell than less experienced people. This supports our
findings where we compared users to non-users. As stated
earlier, these results should encourage future researchers to
run an additional study with larger sample size.
4.2. Experiment II: Allocation of the Budget Between Human
and Algorithm
In one question we asked in the survey, respondents
had a choice between the human and the algorithm (allo-
cating an investment of 10.000€ between both of them).
The following pie charts represent the allocation of the
10.000€ between the two advisors. The first interesting
finding is that most (70%) of the money was given to the
algorithm.
This is an extreme deviation from the actual distribution
of investments managed by human advisors versus algorith-
mic advisors (7,7 Million EUR in 2019 (Statista, 2018)) in
Germany. This is also an interesting finding in the light of
the results of Experiment I. Respondents had a higher loss
tolerance with human advisors but still claim that they would
allocate most of their money to an algorithm11.
Second, we distinguish between people who do not use
Ginmon and people who use Ginmon. There is substantial
difference: Ginmon users allocate a lot more money (80%)
to the algorithmic advisor than non-users (59%). People with
more experience in algorithmic were willing to give more
money to the algorithm. A Z-proportions test supports this
difference (Z = 2.868, p = 0.002).
5. Interpretation, Limitations and Future Research
This chapter will cover interpretation of our results,
limitations of this research and suggestions for future re-
searchers.
5.1. Experiment I: Simulating a Portfolio with Four Different
Portfolio Managers
Some of our findings (H1, H5, H6) were coherent with
Hodge et al. (2018), while others were not (H2, H3, H4).
Regarding the coherent findings in H1, it remains to be said
that Humanized Humans are still the most trusted decision-
makers with the highest loss tolerance among investors. This
finding cumbers the mass adoption for Roboadvisors, as they
will always be benchmarked against the human equivalent.
As a result, many companies started to humanize their advi-
sors – probably as an attempt to gain some of the trustworthi-
ness that is attributed to Humanized Humans. As H5 and H6
show, doing that can have the opposite of the hoped effect –
11Possible explanations for the observed differences in budget allocation
(human versus algorithm) between in Experiment II, real world behavior
and Experiment II are reported in Chapter 5. Interpretation, Limitations
and Future Research.
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Table 11: Extended Cox regression (n=516)
Group B HR 95% CI P Values
Humanized Human
Dehumanized Human .093 1.097 0.659 1.829 .721
Dehumanized Algorithm .627 1.872 1.140 3.074 .013
Humanized Algorithm .982 2.669 1.586 3.490 .000
Gender -.445 .641 .419 .981 .040
Satisfaction with past returns -.180 .835 .684 1.020 .078
Experience with investing .163 1.117 .965 1.436 .108
Figure 6: Allocation of 10.000€ (n=223)
Figure 7: Allocation of 10.000€ split in non-users (n=110) and users of Ginmon (n=113)
at least for people who have never used a Roboadvisor. Hu-
mans seem to trust algorithms for their non-human traits (ra-
tional, neutral, high processing power) and are not looking
for the same traits that are attributed to humans (empathy,
accountability). When interpreting the results of H5 and H6,
it makes sense to call oneself the following in mind: A tech-
nology can be perceived simple and unable to complete com-
plex tasks, if it is named (Hafer et al., 1996; Riegelsberger
et al., 2005). For human advisors, the trust level is increased,
if they share personal information, as it demonstrates their
willingness to risk their reputation (Garner, 2005; O’Keefe,
1990; Pornpitakpan, 2004). Note that a high trust level in
itself is neither positive nor negative, but neutral. For an in-
vestor, it can also be beneficial to lose trust early, as we have
seen in our case with the declining portfolio.
5.2. Differences to Hodge et al. (2018)
Regarding H2, H3 and H4, we have to say that ranks two
to four are not coherent with Hodge et al. (2018) findings.
Especially, Dehumanized Humans ranked higher in our study.
When comparing both studies, we have to keep in mind that
the dependent variables were not the same. We measured,
if and when they sell their portfolio, while the other study
asked for their likelihood to follow the investment advice.
Another possible explanation for the deviations: In our ex-
periment the advisor was also the one making the investment
decision, whereas in Hodge’s experiment it was just an invest-
ment recommendation. In definitive and binding investment
decision-making people seem to still prefer humans over al-
gorithms. However, when it is just about recommendations,
they might prefer an algorithm over a human. Future re-
search should look deeper into that thesis. In addition to
that, the sample (MBA students versus users and non-users
of Roboadvisors) could be a reason for the diverging results.
Furthermore, Hodge provided extensive background infor-
mation while in our case the subjects had to “trust blindly”.
Most of the existing research focuses on AI as a recommen-
dation engine which requires much lower trust levels than in
settings with an algorithm as the final decision-maker. There-
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fore, we encourage other scholars to study experimental set-
tings which allocate more power to the algorithm. A future
study could test, if a higher amount of background informa-
tion about the investment decision leads to higher trust in
algorithmic decisions. This would help exploring, if the dif-
ferences in ranking placements two to four are caused by the
diverging background information provided.
5.3. Experiment II: Allocation of the Budget Between Human
and Algorithm
Respondents said they would allocate 70% of their budget
to the algorithm, even though in reality they behave differ-
ently. There seems to be a difference between people’s in-
tentions and their actions. Experiment I has shown that the
portfolios managed by the algorithm are sold earlier, while
in Experiment II, respondents claim to trust the algorithm
more than the human. One reason could be social desirabil-
ity. Maybe some respondents think trusting AI is what the
researchers expect as a result (Rosenthal effect). Especially,
since parts of the sample were recruited using the author’s
personal social media account.
The result of 70% of budget allocated to the algorithm
is also an extreme deviation from the real world: In 2019,
Roboadvisors had only 7,7 Million EUR under management
in Germany (Statista, 2018). A possible explanation for the
difference could be certain patterns in our sample (young,
many users of Roboadvisors) which prevent generalizations.
Another reason could be that we forced respondents to com-
pare between two options, which is not a realistic scenario.
Future research could dig deeper into the divergence be-
tween intentions (allocating money to the algorithm) and ac-
tions (trusting humans more).
Additionally, it needs to be mentioned that the question
from which this data originates was asked after Experiment
I, which simulated a declining portfolio. Depending on who
managed the declining portfolio, it might affect the answers
to the subsequent question. Since our respondents are ran-
domly assigned to groups with equal sizes, this effect can be
slightly reduced.
5.4. Limitations Caused by the Sample
The overall sample (N = 223, 82% male, MAge = 36,6,
SDAge = 15,7) is not representative for the “average German”
for three reasons.
Firstly, our sample is too young since the non-user group
(N = 110, 70% male, MAge = 27,2, SDAge = 13,5) mainly
consisted of students. The median age of Germans is 44,3
years (UN, 2013). The age difference should not be ne-
glected, since age is a factor in trust in AI and digital prod-
ucts in general (Scopelliti et al., 2005; Evers et al., 2008; Ho
et al., 2005; Hancock et al., 2011). Secondly, our sample
is male-dominated (82%). This might be representative for
users of Roboadvisors or investors in general (Schnell, 2011),
but not for the general population. If the goal is to find out
how Roboadvisor could reach broader adoption, it is recom-
mended to also look at potential users which are underrep-
resented in the current user base (e.g. females). Thirdly,
users were overrepresented in our sample compared to the
German population. Since this is an exploratory work, the
goal was not to have a representative sample for “the aver-
age German”. Nonetheless, the limitations caused need to be
mentioned.
An additional limitation comes with the limited sample
size. The explorative analyses showed that a larger sample
size could be beneficial. For example, a significant p-value
for the Dehumanized Human group in the cox regression (Ta-
ble 3) might be found with an increased sample size.
5.5. Comparing Users to Non-users
When we compare the two subgroups of users and non-
users, we need to keep in mind that the non-user group is a
lot younger and contains less females. These factors could be
intervening variables when we try to make statements about
the effects of being a user of a Roboadvisor.
When opposing users to non-users, the main conclusion
is that we found lower p-values and higher b-values for the
cox regression comparing all four advisor types (Table 8) as
well as for the cox regression with a 2x2 design (Table 9).
An explanation could be that the Ginmon users are more
used to portfolio volatility – no matter who manages it. They
are already familiar with a somewhat humanized algorithm
trading for them (Ginmon’s algorithm is named Apeiron).
They have more experience and therefore were harder to ma-
nipulate with our experimental stimulus. In contrast, non-
users, who most likely interact with a humanized algorithm
for the first time, might be more prone to manipulation.
Consequently, the effect of humanization and advisor type
is weakened compared to the non-users. You could say users
are more immune to the effect of humanization.
In other words, to investigate effects of humanization we
recommend future researchers taking a closer look at non-
users. You could choose to observe people who have no ex-
perience with Roboadvisors to gain a deeper understanding
of the differences between the influence of the four portfo-
lio managers on loss tolerance. Also, you could gain a deeper
understanding of diverging effect of humanizing humans ver-
sus algorithms.
5.6. Further Limitations and Future Research
Given the results of our exploratory analysis (increased
sample size, control varaibles) and user versus non-user com-
parison, we can conclude that future researcher should try
to recruit a bigger sample size, incorporate control variables
and focus on non-users without prior automated investment
experiences.
Trust in Artificial Intelligence is a rather broad topic. For
the sake of feasibility, we had to focus on one specific man-
ifestation of trust (loss tolerance) and one application of AI
(Roboadvisors).
Many researchers tried to operationalize trust but did
not arrive at an overarching conclusion. Therefore, for the
dependent variable we decided to focus on one key aspect
which made sense in the context of investing: How do in-
vestors react to losses? Do they sell or do they hold? This
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comes with the limitation that we did not directly opera-
tionalize and measure trust. Future research could try to
look at the bigger picture of trust, e.g. by surveying multiple
items which cover more than loss reaction and loss tolerance.
The study can be based on other scholars’ attempts to quan-
tify trust. For example, Cho et al. (2015) developed a scale
ranging from complete distrust to complete trust including
undistrust and untrust (Cho et al., 2015).
Also, our choice of the independent variable leads to
certain shortcomings. As mentioned in the literature re-
view, there are dozens of factors which potentially influence
user trust in AI. In order to not exceed the limits of this
research, we manipulated just one variable: humanization.
Humanization is of great interest, as many companies in the
space name their technologies or represent them humanlike
(avatars, chatbots) – especially in finance. Since the effect on
users is controversial in research, we decided to contribute to
that discussion. Within the factor humanization, we – again
– had to narrow it down. We named the decision-maker, but
you could also humanize in other ways, e.g. give him/her
a face or a voice. Future research could look at other fac-
tors which could influence user trust and at other interesting
ways of humanization.
Another limitation is caused by the scope of our study. We
cannot make general statements about AI as a whole. The do-
main is too broad due to the manifold of applications in dif-
ferent industries. We had to focus on AI-based finance prod-
ucts, more specifically Roboadvisors. Humanizing decision-
makers could have the opposite effect (to what we found) in
other domains such as entertainment, navigation or health-
care. Conducting a study in other domains is recommended.
In general, due to the context-dependency of trust, studies in
non-finance environments are also beneficial.
In our survey, we simulated the development of a portfo-
lio over time. Obviously, the ideal and more realistic study
would be a longitudinal study with real money to lose. Due to
time- and budget-constraints this was not feasible, but maybe
it is for other scholars. To give a concrete recommendation:
We would conduct a similar survey, just in the mentioned re-
alistic setting. Instead of just asking, if the subjects would like
to hold or sell, we would add more questions on trust. For
example, you could ask a question such as: Do you consider
the decision-maker trustworthy? You could even offer them
to switch to another decision-maker (human/algorithm) to
allow for joint evaluation. If respondents answer the ques-
tions monthly, and not just directly one after another, it could
lead to interesting insights and we could learn more about
the change in trust over time.
Additionally, the simulation of the declining portfolio as
the first part of the survey biases the questions afterwards.
We still decided to put it first since the question was the
core of our hypotheses and we wanted to maximize the sam-
ple size for the cox regression. Putting other questions first
would have distorted subsequent answers as well. The bias
should be bearable, as the portfolio development was identi-
cal across all four experimental groups. Nonetheless, future
studies could run separate surveys to prevent that shortcom-
ing.
6. Implications
Humanizing AI seems not to be a sufficient solution to
increase users trust in AI – at least in the finance domain.
Also, the trust in AI (in terms of allocated investments) dif-
fers across demographics. You can ask yourself, if increasing
the trust level should always be the end goal. In our experi-
ment, as in many investment decisions in real life, you were
better off (financially), if you lost trust sooner. The findings
of this work have several implications on three different lev-
els: Regulation, User Experience and Technology.
Regulation is an important topic, given the observed will-
ingness of some consumers to allocate a substantial amount
of money to algorithms. But regulators were not able to keep
up with the rapid technological progress. Regulating AI in
general is most likely not suitable since there are plenty of dif-
ferent applications and domains. Nonetheless, there is con-
sensus that a global ethical standard for AI companies would
be beneficial. The challenge is to protect fundamental rights
and freedom while still encourage innovation of AI technolo-
gies. Especially, in our context of humanization and invest-
ments, there are issues arising when the borders between hu-
man and machine become blurred. Formal advancements by
the EU are concerned with anti-discrimination, biases and
fairness of algorithms. Also, in the finance domain, this can
be an issue (e.g. credit scoring). Thelisson (2017) proposes
four solutions: First, a Code of Conduct that one or multiple
companies bind themselves to. Second, Quality Labels and
Audits. This means the company either discloses the code
publicly (issues with interpretability and IP remain) or hires
another authority that looks into the code and certifies it with
some kind of quality seal. Third, transparency in the data
chain. And fourth, de-biasing datasets and algorithms which
can be broken down to discrimination detection and discrim-
ination prevention (Thelisson et al., 2017). The GDPR con-
stitutes that individuals have the right to object to decisions
even if they are made purely on the basis of automation.
In addition, they also have the right to obtain information
about the existence of an automated decision making system
as well as the “logic involved” and its consequences (Thelis-
son, 2017). How this right of explanation plays out practi-
cally (e.g. depth of explanation, technical feasibility) will be
decided in court in the future. The technological aspects of
the explainability will be analyzed in the last paragraph of
this chapter.
User experience also plays an important role to build trust
in AI-based finance products. While humanization was not
beneficial in our case, it still needs to be explored for other
products or to other degrees (e.g. avatars). Other scholars
found out that users prefer conversational agents which are
young, match their ethnicity and show non-verbal cues while
gender does not matter (Cowell and Stanney, 2003). These
agents do not only humanize the product but also increase
personalization and familiarity. There is empirical evidence
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that these factors increase trust and product adoption (Ko-
miak and Benbasat, 2006). From a UX perspective, it could
also be beneficial to give users the option to interact with
and try the algorithm. Dietvorst et al. (2018) showed that
giving users the opportunity to modify the algorithm reduces
algorithm aversion. Giving a share of control back to the hu-
man may sound like a contrast to the idea of a Roboadvisor
(full automation), but even slight modifications increase the
users’ preference for that algorithm (Dietvorst et al., 2018).
Giving the users the possibility to make optional slight alter-
ations (e.g. changing the risk class after the initial invest-
ment) could be a solution. Another factor is accountability.
Who is responsible if the algorithm loses your money? This
can be considered as UX since the product needs to convey a
sense of security (e.g. to make up for lack of accountability).
One solution for startups, which do not have a well-known
brand yet, is to offer the Roboadvisor as a whitelabel solution
of an established bank. But the accountability issue also in-
volves technological aspects (error-proneness) and legal as-
pects (Who can be hold accountable by law?). Additionally,
UI-decisions, such as design, should also have the goal to in-
crease the Roboadvisors’ trustworthiness. An option to over-
come the lack of trust in Roboadvisors is to slowly move cus-
tomers from a conventional bank with a human advisor to a
Roboadvisor. This allows them to downsize advisory opera-
tions. High net-worth individuals can still have their human
account while others can also have the option to take part
in economic growth by investing without expert knowledge.
This is especially crucial for risk-averse, inexperienced, low-
budget individuals (Jung et al., 2018).
Humanization is not a technological challenge in itself
and also not beneficial according to the conducted study.
Therefore, the technological implications evolve mainly
around transparency of algorithms. Many users would be
interested in understanding how the algorithm arrives at its
conclusions by explaining its reasoning. For example, if your
Roboadvisor loses money, you would like to know how it
happened and seek a justification for the action that lead to
losses (e.g. a specific trade) (Gregor and Benbasat, 1999).
This kind of explainable AI would make decision-making
more transparent and predictable and therefore easier to
trust.
7. Conclusion
To conclude, we can say that we arrived at three main
findings. Firstly, for non-users humanizing a human decision-
maker increases loss tolerance, while humanizing an algo-
rithm decreases loss tolerance. Given the slight manipulation
(difference of one word), this finding is astonishing. Sec-
ondly, the humanized Human is still the most trusted finan-
cial advisor. Thirdly, despite the second finding: Respondents
were willing to allocate much more money to the algorithmic
advisor compared to the human advisor. This leaves us with
many opportunities for future research since the scope and
therefore potential generalization was limited in our study.
On a theoretical level, the conclusion is that there are
many theories concerning trust in AI but most of them fo-
cus on automated recommendations for action and the hu-
man as the final decision maker. A structured, comprehensive
model that includes the high number of trust factors and the
algorithm as the decision maker is missing. With the current
raise in automation and the complexity of trust, researchers
from different disciplines shall collaborate to build a holistic
model.
The question determining the next decades is not about
technological feasibility. The amount of data available grows
every day. The crucial question is, if users will trust in the
decisions made by the algorithms. Given the current levels of
users trust in Roboadvisors, a hybrid model of virtual advice
in wealth management that combines human and algorithm
seems to be realistic (Cocca, 2016).
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